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L E  C T U R  I3 S. 
Fridar, 3Iarch 30, 1860. 
Gciicral H.11.I.I. T H E  COnInIAh’nEl~-IN-CHIEF in tho Chair. 
THE MILITARY CHARACTER OF GENERAL SIR 
CHARLES J. NAPIER, G.C.B. 
By Col. ~ ~ T A C D O U G A L L ,  Commandant, Staff College. 
TIIE life of Sir Charles James Nayier, which forms the subject of this 
address, was so full of strangc perils and marvellous escapes, so illustrated 
by greatness of soul and greatness of action, that it iyould almost seem morc 
properly to belong to the age of romance ; and I must bespeak the indul- 
gence of my hearers on account of the inability I feel to do justice to a 
subject of so much intercst in the limited timc at  my command. 
Truly is it said of Sir C. Napicr by his biographer, that *‘ His is thc 
story of a man mi10 ncvcr tarnished his reputation by a shameful deed ; of 
one who subdued distant nations by his d o u r ,  and then governed them so 
wisely, that English rulc was reverenced and loved wherc before it hadbeen 
feared and execrated.” 
It will be my cndcavour in this address to show, imperfectly it must be, 
that iu these words therc is no esaggeration. 
Passing over his childhood and youth, which yet abound in strangely 
interesting incidents, it  was not till he was a Major in the 50th, which 
regiment hc commanded in thc action, that he first saw war in earnest a t  
VOL. IV. Ii 
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122 TIiE XILlTAIX C1IAI:ACTEE 
Coruniia. I do iiot believe tlicre exists a more graphic description of ex- 
citing aiid terrible events, than the record he has left of liis personal share 
in that battle. 
I can only regret that tinic does not admit of my reading the narrative as 
set donn in liis journal, for, although desperately wounded-his ankle 
broken by a bullet-stabbed in tlie back-and engaged in a struggle for his 
liic against niimerous enemies, during which he received another sevcrc 
\round from a sabre cut 011 his bare head-he ~ v a s  yet able to observe and 
to record the minuto events of tlic day nit11 a simplicity, a force, and a self- 
evident accuracy, nhich uiidcr the circumstances are truly astonishing. 
Made prisoner at Corunna and released by the generosity of AIarshal 
Soult, for which good deed the whole Hapier family during their lives 
cherished towards tlic AIarslial tlic warmest gratitude,-ATajor Napier mas 
present as a volunteer a t  the action of the LLCoa,” and, with very unac- 
customed good fortune, escaped 011 that occasion unwounded. 1 3 s  remarks, 
made at the time, on Craufurd’s errors, are nell worthy of study, and shorn 
to what an extent he liad already mastered his profession. 
At llnsaco, again a volunteer, lic received a tcrriblc wound, from the 
effects of which Iic suffered tortures during the remainder of his life; a bullet 
having passed througli his iio~c, broken the left jam, and lodged near thc 
ear. The  operation for the cxtraction of tlic ball \\’as frightful, which hoa- 
ever he treated as lightly, according to the testimony of his cousin who was 
present, as tlic drawing of a tooth. \\'hen i t  was over, he was with diffi- 
culty prevented by Sir E. Pakenliam from rushing back into the fight, with 
his jaw broken, and blood flolving from his mouth. 
His  two brothers, George and \I’Tilliam, were in the battle and liad heard 
of his wound ; but sent liim word that they could not come to see him. 
‘‘ How proud and happy,” hc says in his journal, ‘(this message made me. 
I gloried in them; yet, thinking I could not live long, I was very anxious 
to  see them, especially as I heard George lrad been wounded while gallantly 
leading a charge. \YilKam liad been shot through the hip two months 
beforc, but did not go to the rear, and went into action here with the wound 
still open. \\Tell, we arc all three still alive, and old men : a e  were then 
young, strong, :ind as hardy men as any in the army, and we had fifteen or 
sixtecn wounds betncen us, and bcing very fond of each other it made a talk 
among our comrades.” 
Again we find blajor Napier with his wound still bandaged, riding ninety 
miles in one day to join his regiment, forming part of the force with lvhich 
Wellington pursued blassena. His two brothers nerc in the Light Division 
which led the advance, and which was almost hourly engaged with the 
I:rcnch rcar-guard under Ney. 
Thus advancing, lie met on oiie occasion a litter of branches being carried 
to the rear ; on asking tlic bearers what worindcd oficcr tlicy carried, the 
reply lie receivccl xvas 1‘ Captain Napier, 5211~1, with a broken limb.“ A 
second litter followed, and lic ~vas told tliat i ts occiipaiit was Captaiii Napicr, 
43rd, 6‘ mortally woundcd,” as i t  was supposed a t  tlie tinic. I lco l~ lp  looked 
at them and passed on to  tlie fight in front. 
At  the conclusion of the war Charles, tlicii Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, 
entered the Military College at Farnham. His bfother William was thcrc 
at, tlic same time. Tlic motives whicli induced these men, who liad scrvcd 
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GENERAL SIR UIIhllLES NAI’IER, G.C.1:. 123 
wid, 50  much distinction in the field, to shut themselves up for two ycars 
witllin the walls of a college, are well set forth in a letter of advice whi l i  
thirty p a r s  later the Governor of Scindc addressed to a young o&er :- 
ct BY reading, you will be distinguished ; without it abilities 3re of little 
tlse. f\ man may talk and write: but he cannot learn his profession with- 
out constant study to prepare, especially for the highcr ranks, because he 
t11ere wants the knowledge and experience of others improved by his own. 
Gut shen in a post of responsibility he has no time to  read; and if be  
to such a post with an empty skull, it  is then too late to fill it, and 
makes no figure. 
(1 Thus inany people fail to distinguish themselves, and say they are unfor- 
tunate, which is untrue. Their own previous idleness nnfitted them to profit 
by fortune.” 
In 1822, Colonel &pier was appointed Military Resident at Cephalonia, 
shich gare him despotic po&r over the island, as Lieutenant of the Lord 
High Commissioner. (6 Besides being Ring,” hc says, ‘6 I am bishop also, 
311 the convents and churches are under me ; the priests cannot kill a 
foal without my written order:’ (6 My prede- 
ceesor,” he wrote, (( is going home half dead from the labour ; but to  me, it 
is health, spirit-everything. I take no rest 
mJ-Sdf, and give nobody else any.” Indeed, his labours for the improve- 
ment of the Cephalonians mere as incessant and as successful, as they werc 
afieriyards, on a larger scale, for the regeneration of Scindc. They were 
cut short in 1830, in consequence of a disagreement with the Lord High 
Coinmissioner; but the best testimony to the beneficence of his rule is to  be 
found in the fact, that after he liad quitted Cephalonia for ever apparently 
in disgrace with the Supremc Governor, the peasants of that island volun- 
tarily cultivated a small piecc of land, left by him uncared for, and trans- 
mitted to him yearly the value of the produce. 
I shall have to relate a parallel instance which occurred twenty years 
later, when he was quitting India for the last time at enmity with the 
Indian Government. 
In 1539, Major-General Sir Charles Napier was selected for the com- 
mand of the Northern district, at tho time when the Chartist agitation was 
at its highest and an outbreak seemed imminent ; and the details of his pro- 
ceedings in this anxious post-his sagacity-his forbearance-the tact with 
which he reessured tho ovcr-timid, and restrained the over-violent-arc full 
of interest and instruction. 
During his Northern command Sir C. Nspier’s health began to give way. 
He fancied himself threathened with blindness, and complains occasionally 
in his journal of the unendurable agonies he suffered-the consequence of 
his Busaco wound. IIc evidently believed that lie was failing-that his 
Work was well nigh d o n o a n d  that his character and ability must be judged 
1 ) ~  the cleeds of his past life. IIe little thought that-the most brilliant part 
of his carecr lay in the future-that opportunity \rould yet be afforded him 
to prove that his ability both for war and. for government were of the very 
lligllest order ; and that lie only wanted equal opportunities to become the 
rival in rcnoi~n, as I verily believe him to have been thc equal in genius, of 
tile greatest captains of the world. 
It i$ strange to  observe how late in life the great work to which they seem 
K 3  
The work was excessive. 
I live for some‘usc now. 
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124 TIIF, MILITARY CHA1:ACTEX 
born comes to some men. Appointed Major-General on the Bombay staff 
in 1842, Sir C. Napier was sixty-tao mhen his selection by Lord Ellen- 
borough for Scinde first gave him an independent militiry command. 
Scinde was at this time still heaving with the swell occasioned by the 
Cabool disaster, aud agitated with hatred to British authority. 
I am not here to  consider the justice or policy of the conquest of Scindc, 
That  conquest was effected by Sir C. Napier as an executive officer in the 
unquestioned discharge of his duty, with a rapidity, a complctcness, and a 
clemency, almost unparallelecl in  history, and whose effects haw been as en- 
during as they have been beueficial to the conquered race. 
It scems to have been Sir C. Napicr’s destiny to  be placed continually 
amid scenes of terror and suffering, and to espcrience marvellous escapes 
from deadly peril. No sooner did the steamer, in mhich he now embarked 
at Bombay for R~rrachce, gain tho open cea, than cholera broke out on 
hoard in its niost frightful form. 
I n  tho sir (1 bitter days and nights,” as he calls them in his journal, dur- 
ing which thc v o ~ a g e  lasted, fifty-four dead bodies were cast into the sea, 
just one-fourth of the whole living freight ; eighty more were seized, of 
whom ten died after landing. To crown all, the steamer nearly went ashore 
on a dark night, when making the land, owing to the drunkenness of the 
two mates. 
Escaped from these dangers, tlic ill-timed cxplosion of a rocket, four days 
after he landed, tore the calf of his leg open to  the bone and inflicted what 
might haw. been a w r y  dangerons injury ; but the wound healed, as doctors 
say, Li by the first intention,” owing probably to his remarkable temperance 
both in eating and drinking, and five days afterwards he n a s  travelling 
towards Ilydralml. 
I t  RYPS inha- 
bited by three distinct races, l3cloochees, Ilindoos, and Scindians proper. 
The  Ameers, princes of thc land, were chieftains over the lleloochces, tyrants 
over the other two. 
A treaty, concluded by Lord Auckland three years before, gave to the 
British control as a paramount power over the Ameers, and the right of 
military occupation of certain places in Scinde ; but when Sir C. Napicr 
arrived, the Ameers, encouraged by the recent Cabool disaster, were ex- 
citing the mountain tribes to war and preparing for i t  themselves. 
I t  was precisely at  tho time when, to re-establish Ilritish prcst:ge, General 
Nott advanced from Candnhar to join General I’oIlock at Cabool, with 
orders afterwards to retirc! to lndia by the Kliybcr pass, while Colonel 
England with a part of Nott’s force fell back into Scinde by the Bolan pass. 
While the troops were thus dispersed, the safety of England’s column, and 
British supremacy in Scinde, evidently depended on the enpacity of Sir C. 
Napier as a politician and a commander. 
Thc  places occupied by the British under the treaty, were Sukkur, Rorcc, 
Shikarpore, and Kurrachec. 
The possession of Sukkur and tloree afforded a secure passage of the 
Indus from cither bank, and was of great stragetical importance ; not only 
because it enabled the General to operate by either bank of the river at will, 
but because those places constituted a base of operations for the British 
force, which could thence communicate with the British North-west pro- 
Scinde  as at this time in a very disturbed politic31 state. 
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OF CENElUL SIR CIIAXLT:S XAPIER, G.C.B. 125 
>.inces and tlie Bengal army, through the friendly territory of the ruler of 
ll'hen Sir  C. Napier assumed the command, the force in Scinde did not 
4,000 men, and was about equally divided between Sukkur and Knr- 
ra&ee ; that is to say, 400 miles asunder, with insecure communication, 
The remainder of .the troops intended to form his army were with Colonel 
England, approaching Sukkur by the Bolan pass ; when these joined, as 
did shortly after, his force amounted to about 9,000 men of all arms. 
811 the Ameers both of Upper. and Lower Scinde, with the exception of 
Ali filoorad, had entered into 3. league against the British ; but it was their 
ureat object to postpone a rupture for two reasons. 
a 1st. 'ro gain time for the assembly of their troops ; and they conld bring 
together, if time were given them, between 70,000 and 80,000 men. 
2nd. To defer military operations to  the approaching hot season, when the 
g n  nould prove their most powxful ally. 
Every artifice vas therefore cmploJ-ed to deceive the English General as 
to their intentions. 
Sir C. Napicr was thought fortunate in Iiaviirg, a t  this crisis, the assist- 
ance of an experienced Indian officer as political agent, who had spent his 
life in unravelling the threads of Indian intrigue, and was generally supposed 
to be 
But repeated infractions of tho treaty by the Aineers, and the certain in- 
formation that they sicre sccretly assembling their troops, convinced Sir C. 
xapier, although these facts failed to convince Major Outram, the political 
agent referred to, that those princes only waited their opportunity to attack 
him. I l e  wrotc this opinion to Lord Ellenborough as early as the 30th 
November, and on the OGth December, before his enemies' plans were ripe, 
he took advantage of a fresh violation of the treaty to march suddenly on 
Khprpore, the capital of Upper Scintlc, with 3,000 men and 18 guns. 
Dismayed by tliis act of vigour, the Amccrs of Upper Scinde went off to 
join their friends in the south with their fighting men, their families, and 
their treasures. 
Thus Upper Scinde was cleared of cnemics, but the task which rcinaincd 
to the English General was by no means easy. It was now the beginning 
of January. The hot ~ ~ s o i i  began in  March, after which military opera- 
tions was only another term for death to Europcan troops. Sir C. Napier's 
intelligence department, in the organization of which he l ~as  never been 
surpassecl, gaw him certain information that the Bclooch tribes were mus- 
tering about Hydrabad ; and that place, which must be his object, was 150 
miles distant. He had at his disposal in all Scinde only 9,000 men, of whom 
at  least three-fourtlis were Scpoys. 3,000 was tlie largest number he coiild 
bring into the field, after providing for the garrisons of Sukkur, Rorec, and 
Rurrachee, on account of the impossibility of procuring transport ; the drcad 
of the Ameers being over the coi i t ractors ,~~ much so that the principal con- 
tractor forfeited his deposit rather than incur their vengeance. 
Sir C. Napie'r now learned that the Amccrs had thrown a garrison of 
2,000 men into Emauni-Ghur, a strong fbit situated in the lieart of the 
desert, on the flank of his line of march towards IIydrabad. 
If he marched on Hydrabad, he would encounter the principal Delooch 
army supportcd on that foitress, and having hIecrporc and Omcrcote, for- 
BhaH'ulpOre. 
master of the art. 
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126 TIIE MILITABY CIIAEACTER 
tified places in the descrt, to rctirc upon, \vhilo the troops from Emauin. 
Ghur, in all probability strongly reinforced br fresh tribes, acted on liis 
rear and cut off all communication with Rorcc. And thcre every 
reason to bclicvc th:it if tlic Arnccrs gained fin advantage however slight, 
the Affglians and Sikhs, wlio isere watchiiig the progress of C S C ~ I ~ ~ ,  o u l d  
take part in thc war. 
Weighing a11 thc chauccs, Sir C, Napicr resolved to rcducc Emaiim-Ghur. 
This fort, armed and provisioned by the Aniecrs to  serve as a base for the 
&1ooch army of Upper Scinde, was supposed, from its position, inaccessible 
to European troops, and from its strength impregnable. Situated in the 
very heart of the waste, tight long marches from thepdgc of the desert, its 
exact position WLS unknown. The  tracks by which the troops must move 
to  rcnch it, and tho ~ ~ 1 1 s  on which their existence depended during the march, 
must bc pointed out by iiativc guides, and thesc men might be traitors. 
Several thousands of wild horsemen, too, hovered about the edge of the 
desert, able to 611 up the aclls o r  poison the waters, and watching to fa11 on 
the fainting soldiers. 
Uut both the moral and phyiical a h n t a g e s  
of succcss promised to be SO grcat that the Goncral determined on the 
enterprise. 
Reports of the depth of sand and scarcity of water along the route he 
must take having convinced him of tho impossibility of operating with a 
large forcc, he selected 200 irrcgular cavalry, picked 550 of the hardiest 
and most active men of the 22d rcgimcnt, aiid put them on camels, loaded 
ten camels with provisions, eighty with a-ater-aiid a i t h  this handful of 
men and two brcaching licwitzcrs, lie marched on the evening of the 6th 
January. 
Next day forage failed, aiid watcr became scarce. He sent back three- 
fourths of his cavalry, rctainiiig only fifty, and resolute to  proceed 60 long 
as he could keep a hundred men togethcr. 
On the eighth day, liaving during their anxious march lived from hand 
to mouth, uncertain each morning whether water would bc found in the 
evening-and several times it was not found-the little forcc reached 
Emaum-Ghur, wlierc the justness of tho General's calculations was a t  oncc 
apparent, for the Uelooch commandant, with a strong fort well armed 
and provisioned, and liaving B garrison six timcs as numcrous as the force 
moving against him, was yet so panic-struck by the audacity of thc 
English general, that he had cviicuated the placc tEo days before, leaving 
all his stores of grain and powder behiiid him. 
Sir C. Napicr destroyed this fortress, retraced his steps through the 
desert, and joined his main body a t  Peer-Abu-Uckr, where it had been or- 
dered to await him, on the 23rd January, without the loss of a man- 
without even ia sick soldier-having completely effected his object, having 
destroyed once and for ever the confidence of his enemies in their desert 
as a protection, and baffled their plan of campaign. 
It was now Sir C. Napier's business to persundc OY to  forcc thr  
Rmeers formally to sign a new treaty, which had been imposed upon them 
by Lord Ellenborough 8 s  a penalty for their repeated violation of the 
first, and which new trcaty they had signified their readiness to accept vith 
many protestatioiis of loyiilty. 
Tliesc %ere the difficnltics. 
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OF GENERAL SIR OIIARLES NAPIERj G.C.D. 127 
,rile lllllcers temporised ; Sir C. Napier thrcatened to march against 
tllcln illstantly if thcy did not sign; but dcfcrrcd the cxccution of this threat 
tiie urgelit cntreaty of filajor Ontram, ~ h o  exprcsscd the fullest con- 
fidellcc in the peaceful intcl1tiOl1S Of tho Amccrs, alld in thcir snbmission to 
his demands. 
But tilc llot season was drawing 011, aiid it bccanic iicccssary to put 
an The  25th Jnnnary \\'as fixed as tho last day for 
the signing of the treaty, and, that day having passed, the General 
marched towards Hydrabad- 
IIis field 
forre about 3,000 strong, based 011 Sukkur and Roree, with a division 
of the Benga] army in reSCrYe a t  Lihawulpore, forming a link bctween 
hirn and the British North-mst provinces. IIis right rcsted on the Indus, 
on allose broad waters floated his armcd stcamcrs and supplies. IIis 
left on the dcscrt, which was sivcpt by Jacob with his Scinde horse- 
men, and where the cncmy no longer posscsscd a strong placc whence 
they might threaten his flank and his communications. 
Sir C. Napier halted sixty miles north of Hydrabad, and, anxious to 
avoid bloodshed, he gave tho Anicers to the 6th Fcbrunry to ratify the 
treaty. He even extended the time six days beyond that date, viz. to the 
12th February, to enable fiIajor Outram to proceed to Hydrabad to 
try the effect of his personal influence with the Amccrs, which that officer 
lyas convinced would be successfully excrtcd, 
Let me here pause in my narrative to recall thc scene in the House 
of Commons, whcrc a iioble Lord opposcd the vote of thanks to Sir C. 
Hapier, on the ground that he had nccdlcsely and wickedly pushed on 
hostilities for the sake of militaq glory. Here 
at the most critical pcriod-when the General had certain information 
that the fiery cross had passed throngh the land, and that the Bclooch clans 
had gathered, and mcre still gathering, round Hydrabad7whcn the foe- 
men actually assembled outnumbcred him by cight to one-so earnestly de- 
sirous was he to  avoid bloodshed, that he risked the safety of his army, 
the prestige of the British name, and in all probability British supremacy 
in the East, by according a delay of seventeen days to  thc Amecrs, 
which he felt morally ccrtain would be employcd against him by the assem- 
bly of thousands of additional enemies. 
What should me not havc heard of Sir C. Napier's facile credulity 
and weakness in granting this delay, if he had bccn beaten at 3Icanee 2 
These things are of the past, and the English nation unmistakeably 
pronounced its verdict a t  the time; but I cannot rcfrain from here saying, 
that the accusation solemnly niadc on thcaccasion 1 havc rcfcrred to, against 
an absent general, who was literally wearing out his lifo in his country's 
service, was as shameful to the accuser as it  was false in fact. 
The most convincing disproof of this accusation is supplied by this frag- 
ment of a newspaper which I hold in my hand. 
By thc adverse statements of his enemies, thc thanks of the IIouses of 
Parliament to Sir C. Napier and his army for the victories of AIcanec and 
Hydrabad were delayed for a whole year, in order to give time for the most 
searching inqniry ; that inquiry having bcen made, Sir Robert Pccl, in 
Pebriinry, 18.1 I, i i i  moving a vote of thanks, used the foIIowing Iangtlngc :- 
to a11 uncertainty. 
~i~ military position was now secure and cornmauding. 
rJow what was the fact ? 
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128 TIIE BIILITARY CIIATIACTEIC 
I n  his opinion there was conclusive proof, that if Sir C .  hTapier had 
passed one day inactively, or if he had attempted to retreat, or if he had not 
taken that course which his own wisdom combined with his military skill had 
pointed out, not one day could have elapsed without the army being cut off ; 
and a disaster would have occurred of which, following so closely on that 
of Cabool, the consequences it would be difficult to surmise. But estimating 
the conduct of Sir C. Napier, he rflust say he did not think his chief praise 
%.as his military knowledge or his personal vaiour : he thought his chief 
praise mas this, that, seeing the position in which he mas placed, he well and 
deliberately considered all the consequences likely to ensue ;-that, knowing 
the shock to the British Empire in the east, the danger that was incurred, 
the injury to its reputatioii from the disaster of Cabool, he, on his own 
responsibility, with less of local knowledge, with less of local experience, 
than those by whom he was surrounded, had the moral courage to act in 
opposition to their advice, and to that the army oned its safety.” 
On the IYtli, in answer to  Major Outram’s renewed entreaties for further 
delay,written from Hydrabad, the General declared he would wait no longer, 
saying-“ I have delayed at risk of the lives of my men, and of my own 
character as an officer, not to the elcrentli but to the twelfth hour. If men 
die in consequence of my delay, their blood may be justly charged to my 
account.” 
On the 15th, the dreani of Major Outrani was rudely broken by an attack 
made upon his Residency a t  Hydrabad, by 6,000 Belooch warriors. His 
little escort, formed of the light company of the 22nd, after holding the post 
successfully for several hours, was drawn off on board steamers which the 
forcsiglit of the General had despatched to Hydrabad, and steaming up the 
riqer, joined Sir C. &pier on the lGth a t  Nuttaree, a t  which place hc had 
arrived on his southmrd march. 
Sir  C. Napier knew that an overwhelming Belooch force was at fiIeanee, 
and its numbers were being hourly increased. H e  resolved to attack them 
at once. H e  had read the Duke of Wellington’s remarks on Colonel 
RIonson’s disastrous rctrcat before the Mahrattas, and dreis from them the 
conclusion never to give way before barharians. ‘‘ Let tlic Beloochees be 
sixty or one hundred thousand,” he said, 6‘ I will fight.” 
Before daybreak on tlic 17th he marched. A t  eight o’clock in the 
morning liis lino was formed in front of the lzelooch position, which was 
very strong and defended by 30,000 men, 5,000 being cavalry. 
The  Amccrs’ front extendcd 1,200 yards along the dry bed of the Pulailcc 
River, the banks of which, sloping gradually down towards the plain in front 
like a glacis, afforded the infantry d i i c h  lined them ,111 the defence of a 
parapet. 
The  Amecrs’ left rcstcd on n shikargah, or hunting forest, which was 
inclosed by a high wall having only one opening, a gateway, about midway 
betmen the Llelooch and the ljritisli lines, that is to say, about 500 yards 
from each ; and in this shikargah 5,000 of the enemy’s matchlock men were 
posted to sally out on the right rear of tlic British, so soon as they should 
be engaged with the I3elooch main body in front. 
The Ameers’ right was also protected by a shikarph, which mas inter- 
sected by deep iiullahs running at right angles to the Fulailee. 
Their guas, fifteen in number, were in two masses on the flanks, and their 
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camp and cavalry were placed in a loop, formed by a sudden bend of the 
river to  the rear. 
A t  nine o’clock the British line advanced to the attack iii echellon of 
battalions ; the right, composed of two batteries and H e r  3Iajesty’s 22nd 
regiment, being in front. The General’s quick eye iiistantly detected the 
danger to which his right flank was exposed from the 5,000 matchlock men 
in the inclosed shikargah. 
He rode near the wall, found it about ten feet high, not loopholed, and 
the?, riding throngh the opening under a play of matchlocks, he observed 
there was no scaffolding to enable the enemy to fire over the top. 
‘( Then,” in the words of the historian, tho inspiration of genius came to 
the aid of heroism. Taking the grenadiers of the 22nd, he thrust them at  
once into the opening, telling theirbrave Captain Tew, that he was to block up 
that entrance ; to die there if it must be, never to give way ! And well did the 
gallant fellow obey his orders ; he died there, bnt the opening was defended.” 
As the British closed to within 100 yards of the enemy, the voice of the 
General  as heard along the line commanding the charge. 
The  guns on the right were run up into a position, whence they swept the 
dense masses of Beloochees diagonally. 
The 22nd were on the top of the bank i n n  moment, thinkiug to bear down 
all before them; but they paused in nniazementat the forest of swords waving 
in  their front, which had beon up to that moment concealed from their view 
by the elevated river tank. 
I t  mould be a desecration to attempt to convey the scene in any other 
than the language of Sir William Napier:- 
6‘ Thick as standing corn, aud gorgeous as a field of floxcrs, stood the 
Beloochees in their many-colourcd garments and turbans; they filled the 
broad deep bed of the Fulailce, they clustered on both banks, and covered 
the plain beyond. Guarding their heads xith their large dark shields, they 
shook their sharp swords beaniing in the sun ; their shouts rolled like a peal 
of thunder, as with frantic gestures thcy rushed fornard, and full against 
the front of the 22nd dashed with demoniac strength and ferocity. But 
with shouts as loud and shrieks as mild and fierce as theirs, and hearts as 
big and arms as strong, the Irish soldiers met them with that queen of 
weapons, the musket, and sent their foremost masses rolling back in blood.” 
Tho battle lasted for three hours, and there was danger of the British 
becoming physically cxhausted by the efforts necessary to repel the constant 
rushes of fresh opponents. 
Under their repeated attacks even the 22nd were forced several tiines to 
give ground, but a h a y s  their General mas there to cheer and rally them. 
He remained during the whole of this conflict on horseback between the 
opposing lines, which were often not niorc than fifteen fcet apart, and running 
nearly as much risk from the muskets of his own soldiers as from the 
matchlocks of the enemy. He exposed himself to  greater dangcr than any 
man in his raiiks, bccause l& saw that it was a necessity; the 22nd were 
young soldiers, and if they had given way the battle would have been lost, 
and with it perhaps the British rule in India. But at his voice and demeanour 
their strength returned and they recovered their ground, though nearly 
deprived of regimental leaders, foy those leaders had gone down fast, falling 
as British officers should, and always will do, when they cannot advance. 
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Aliltonfs grand linesaro so applicablc to thc English leader 011 this occasion 
that I cannot refrain from quoting them : 
6' If OIICO thcy hcar that ioicc. thcir livclicd plcilgc 
Of tiope in fcnrs and dnngcrs ; licnrd bo oft 
111 worst cstrcmcs and 011 tlic pcriloua cdgc 
Of battle \\lien it ragcd; in all t ~ s ~ u l b  
Tlicir surcst signal ; they nil1 soon rcmttic 
h'cw courage and revive." 
In  cvcry battle thcrc is a critical period which offers victory to that 
commander who first pcrccives it, and most promptly scizce thc ocmsion. 
That crisis had now arrived. Jacob's horsc having yainly attcmpted to 
penetrate the shikargah on thc Bclooch right, with the view of turning that 
flank, Sir C. Napicr sent orders to  tlic wholc of the cavalry to chargc in one 
mss  full on the cncmy's right. Dashing through thc Belooch guns, the 
troopers crossed the bed of tlic river, charged xvith irrcsistibk fury on the 
dense masscs of the cncmy drawn up in the plain beyond, and spread 
confusion dong thc rear of tlic Dclooch line engaged in the Fulailcc. 
Then at last the Eastern swordsmcn mavcrcd, and, prcsscd by tho British, 
bcgan slowly t o  rctrcat, not in panic or confusion, but in such large masses 
and with so determined a bearing, that thc Gcncral did not dccm it  prudent 
with his exhaustcd troops to push thc pursuit far. 
Such was tlic battle of fiIcanec; arid if KC consider the individual 
bravery and strength of tho Belooch varriors, and thcir numbers-for ccr- 
tainly not less than 28,000 ivcrc prescnt on tlic ficld-as nell as the strength 
of thcir position ; wlicn we rcmcmbcr that Sir C. Napicr's force engaged 
did not. actually number more than 2,000 men, and the remarkable fact, 
that of thesc only 800 wcro Europeans, n e  mnst concludc that this W F R S  one 
of the most extraordinary battles that ever was fought. 
Next morning, in  ansmcr to a summons froni thc Gcncral, so astounding 
was thc moral cffect of the victory, that six sovcrcign princes gave thcm- 
selves up as his prisoners, and yielded the strong fortress of Hydrabad 
with its largc trcasurc. 
In  Sir C. Napicr's despatch, the iiamcs of private soldiers who distin- 
guifihed tlicmsclvcs in battle wcrc for the first timc publishcd to thcir 
countrymen ; and for this causc, if for no other, his memory aught always 
to be dear to thc heart of tlic private soldier. 
The  battle had been won, aid Hydrabad occupicd, yct thc situation of 
the victor was one of no small difficulty. 
His force was considerably reduced, yet lie was obliged to detach 500 
men to garrison Hydrabad ; for that place was too far from the Indus, by 
which alone hc could rcceive his supplies, to serve as a base or even as a 
depbt, bemuse he had not carriage sufficient to transport his stores over the 
four miles of road which separated the fortress from the river. 
A fresh Belooch army was gathering a t  Bleerporc uiider Shcrc Mahomed ; 
and the hot season was coming on apace, the mercury already indicating 
112" in thc shade. 
The  British General, hitherto so daring, suddenly became tho most 
cantious of commnnders. Ilc judgcil that if hc marched at once against 
AIecrporc, the Anircr ~ o i i l d  retire to Omercotc, to cnticc the small ltritish 
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force to its d f a t y t i o n  fr:m heat and sickness in tho desert. I3ut zn ap- 
p r a n c e  of,hmidity 011 his part nould encourage Sherc BIahomcd to come 
to attack him, t h  very thing the General dcsirecl. Rleanwhilc lic would 
timc for the nrriv:d of rciiiforccmcuts from Kurrnchec and Sukkur. 
He accordingly entrciichcd a camp 011 tlic Iiidus to protect the steamer 
station, and to serve as his b:m; aid in it lie placed his hospitals and 
stores. But while thus preseiitiiig 811 appearance of timidity to his cIicmics, 
lie mas careful to guard against its affecting the minds of his own soldiers, 
by neglecting to  avail himself of the protection of his camp, and obliging 
the troops to pitch their tents outside on the open plain ; by this, and by 
other meaiis, leading them to believe that he held the Ameer’s army in 
contempt. 
The weak British form iiow shcwcd like a small rock in the midst of a 
rising flood, which threatened to submerge it. 
Slierc Afahomed, at the lieacl of n forcc whosc immbcrs were variously 
reported between twenty-five and forty thousand men, advanced to  within 
ten miles of Hydrabad, loudly boasting tliat he mould “Cabul”  the 
British. 
All the hill tribes, encouraged by the confident bearing of thc Ameer 
and by the apparent fimidity of the British General, were preparing to 
descend into the plains. 
Dawks werc stopped and stations plundered. The rcinforcements which 
the General expected from Sukkur ran grcat danger of being cut off and 
destroyed by the Ameer, whose position cominanded the line of march of 
those reinforcements, a t  the samo time that it threatened Hydrabad and the 
nritish camp on thc Indus. 
The situation of the English Geaeral was now full of anxiety. 
His field force, reduced by battle and sickness to 2,000 men, had to  per- 
form a duty beyond its capacity ; that is to say, it was required to garrison 
Hydrabad, to defend the camp on the Tndus, four miles distant from that 
fortress, and to guard a large pleasure gnrdcn, half a mile from the camp, 
where the captive Aniccrs were confined ; while n hostile army of 25,000 
men occupied a central position only ten miles off whence it threatened at 
once these three fractions into which the British force was of necessity 
divided, aiid the reinforcements which sere marching to join it. 
I t  was not alone iieccssary to ensnrc the safc arrival of the reinforce- 
ments ; but they must arrive, aiid Shere nIahomed‘s army must bc beaten 
and dispersed, by the 25th illarch ; becau’sc between that date and the 
commencement of the unendurable heat, barely timc enough would remain 
for the reduction of the Ameer’s fortresses of AIecrporc and Omercotc, 
without which he would be able to renew the war a t  any moment. 
Without cntcring into details, which arc hoxewr well worthy being 
studied, it must suficc to say, that, by n scrics of arrangements and opera- 
tions which present 9 combination of great skill and sagacity, with that 
good fortune which all great comnianders appear to sliarc in common, the 
rcinforcemeiits were brought safely into Sir C. Napicr’s camp on the 91d. 
On tlie morning of the 24th, with 5,000 mcn and nineteen guns, he 
marched against Shere nlahomed, who nas strongly entrenched a t  Dubbn 
with ‘25,000 men, defeated him with the loss of 5,000 men, seventeen 
standards, and fifteen pins, and completely dispersed his army. 
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T h e  British loss was 270, of which number 147 were of the 22nd 
regiment alone, thus sheising, even in this favourable instance where the 
P2nd were unusually well-supported by the Sepoy battalions, how immense 
is the proportion of the fighting and the loss which Europeans always 
have to sustain when joined with Eastern troops. 
The ease with which it was ~ 0 1 1 ,  
and the disproportionate loss between the victors and vanquished, furnish 
the highest testimony to the skill of the General. But for that skill 
the loss of his troops would have been far greater ; and if the slaughter 
of the Beloochees had been less,. and their defeat less crushing, the war 
would have been prolonged, and ;L greatly increased loss of life would 
have been the result. 
Sir  C. Napier’s opinion was, that the best method to  save bloodshed 
for a soldier is to be master of his profession. 
c‘ How else,” he said, ‘6 could I command with honour ? HOW answer 
for the lires of those entrusted to  my charge? An ignorant general 
is a murderer: all brave men confide in the knodcdge he pretends to 
poksess, and when the death trial comes their generous blood flows in 
vain ! Merciful God ! how can an ignorant man charge himself with 
so much blood? I have studied iver long, earnestly, and deeply, yet 
tremble a t  my own deficiencies.” 
After the battle, the Ameer, mitli tho discouraged remnant of his army, 
had retired on RIeerporc, Sir C. Napier, one of the commanders who 
thought nothing was done so long as anything reniained to do, prepared 
to follow np his stroke wvliilc the effect of tho battle was fresh. 
Tho troops had fought for three hours in the battle, with the thermo- 
meter at 11O’in tho shade. Their General gave them but eight hours’ 
rest, and marched on AIeerpore. His wisdom in pressing on was proved 
by the fact, that the troops in this march passed through tEo strongly 
entrenched positions which tho Lion had prepared, and had intended to  
dispute, but which, in thc panic immediately succeeding the action, he 
could not get sufficient men to defend. This, however, would not have 
been the case a few days later. 
The day after the battle Sir C. Napier’s cavalry was at the gates of 
AIeerporc, forty miles froni the field. The consequence of this vigour was 
that Shere Xahomed abandoned his capital, and fled with his family and 
treasure to Omcrcote. 
Even while taking possession of Meerporc the General sent the Scinde 
horse, a camel battery, and a regiment of infantry in pursuit of the flying 
Ameer, who, thus pressed, abandoned Omercote as he had done Meerpore ; 
and Omercote, the desert fortress, Shere Rlahomed’s last resource, 60 miles 
from the edge of the desert and 100 from the field of Dubba, opened its 
gates and was garrisoned by a British detnchnient just ten days after thc 
battle. Shere blahomcd now became a wanderer over the face of the country, 
mith few followers and without a resting place. 
Meerpore end Omcrcote were both strong places, well armed and pro- 
visioned, and, if defended by a resolute enemy, might have detained the 
General in the field far into the hot season ; thus enabling Shere Mahomed 
t o  gather a new forcc and to prolong thc mar. 
The army h6d inarched from its camp on the Indus to attack Shere 
This also was a wonderful battle. 
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OF GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAl'IER, G.C.C. 133 
fiIahomed on the 24th March. On the 8 th  of April it  was back a t  Hy- 
drabad, and Sir c. Napier slept in the palace of the Ameers, master of 
Scinde, having in sixteen days defeated 25,000 enemies in battle, captured 
Shere Mahomed honever was still at large, and to complete the tranquillity 
of Scinde it was necessary to capture him. For this purpose Sir C. Napier 
again took the field towards the end of May, when the mercury stood at 
130" in the tents. The Aineer had in the intern1 collected about 10,Ooo 
men; and the General drew a circle of troops round him to prevent his 
esmpc. On the l4th June Slierc Alaliomed tnadc a dash at the \x*eakest 
part of the circle, was beaten, and his force utterly dispersed by i\Iajor 
jacob. Thc General heard the cannonade, knew that Jacob must be engaged, 
and feared he might be orerwhclmed. On the 15th, while still in anxious 
as to the result, he was struck down by sun-stroke at  the same 
tilne with several other Europeans ; he alone of all who were thus attacked 
gas left alirc a t  the end of tlirce horns. He attributed his own recovery on 
tliis 0cm.sion partly to the reviving effect of the news of Jacob's victory, partly 
to his remarkable abstinence in eating and drinking. 
'' Wc'havc taught the Beloochee," said the 
General, '' that neither his sun, 1101' his desert, iior his jnngles, nor his 
n&hs, can stop US, and he rvill ner-er face us more." 
3Iost of the great fendal chieftains came in and took tlic oath of fidelity 
to the British Governor, and what is more they kept it. And the just and 
beneficent ride of Sir C. Napier conciliated to such a degree the respect and 
attachment of these wild warriors, on whom he had laid so heavy a hand, 
that long afterwards, when he rvas leaving India for the last time, a t  enmity 
with the East Indian Government, and when they liad no longer anything 
to hope or fear from his favour or his anger, the Uelooch Sirdars flocked in 
hundreds to pay their respects to him at Hydrabad, and asked leave to 
present him with a sword of honour. That sword is now an heirloom in his 
family. 
The scenc on this occasion lias been described to me by an eye-witness, as 
lia~iug been as affecting a6 it  was remarkable. rlIl the avenues into Hy- 
drabad were crowded by the great nclooch Chieftans and Sirdars of Sciude, 
the shaggy mountain ponies on which nmny of them rode shewing they had 
come from the distant hills. Many of them Ied their sons by tile hand, 
entreating Sir C. Napicr that he would lay his conquering hand on their 
young heads, in the belief that his touch would confer fortune and blessing. 
Surely in the face of ;L fact like this, all detrsction of his policy and 
humanity as a n  administrator-no less than of his skill and energy as a 
mldier-must be altogether vain. His  was essentially the glove of velvet 
cowring the hand of iron ; and his touch was so light, that its force, exerted 
with crushing effect on evil-doers, was to  the well-disposed and thcloyal known 
ollly from memory or from its action upon the robber and tlic oppressor. 
In reviewing the operations of which I have been able to give only n very 
imperfect summary, the first thought that suggests itself is thc marvellous 
activity and endurance, both of mind and body, of thc English General. 
During operations in thc field; though in the saddle all day, he alone of dl 
his force was habitually debarred from rest a t  night, and compelled to devote 
the hours nature has designed for the restoration of the exhausted body 
fortified places, and marched 200 miles under a Scindian sun. 
Scinde was nom conquered. 
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to wearisome correspondence, of which the vindication of his fzulne froin 
CalumIIious attack formed no small portion. 
I do not bcliere either ancient or modern history furnishes a parallel 
instance of a man being called on for tlic first time in his life at-thc 
advanced age of sixty-two to  command an army in the field under cir- 
cumstances of so much complication and responsibility. 
Thrown suddenly i n  the midst of the, to him, altogether novel field of 
Eastern intrigue, he yet unravelled all its threads with far more than the 
skill and tact of tlie oldest Indian diplomatist ; and while his political atlnche‘, 
a man who had been bred to the business, was so blinded and cajoled by 
the Ameers that he inc~ssantly urged the General to take no 05ensive 
measures, thus throwing upon him a n  awful responsibility which few men 
mould have been bold enough to face, - Sir C. Napier alone among his 
army, clearly perceiving the danger, disregarded the responsibility, and out 
of the “iiettlc danger” plucked (( the flower safety,” by attacking and 
defeating a force fifteen times his strength. 
If it is seldom tlint we see consummntc pr~tdencc tempering the ardour and 
confidence of a youthful general, it is rarer still to find the fire and vigour 
of youth animating the sagacity of the veteran. Sir C. Napicr possessed in 
the highcst degree the combination of these generally opposing qualities. 
Sir  C. Napicr has been censured by self-constituted judges for undertaking 
important operations with an inadequate force - such, for example, as his 
march through the desert to Eniaum-Ghur, and his attack on the enemy’s 
position a t  Meanec. No man knew better tlian he the danger of despising 
an enemy, or the propriety of bringing to tlic decisive point every man, horse, 
and gun, that could by any possible foresight and combination bc arrayed 
there. But in the coursc lie actually pursued, he n.as gowrncd by necessity 
-choice he had none. 
There arc sonic couutrics where the want of sripplies and natural obstacles 
render it impossiblc to  operate with a largc force. Notably in Scinde, the 
scarcity of water at certain seasons, and the want of carriage a t  all times, 
formed two of tliesc controlling causcs. On account of tlie first, during the 
march to Emaum-Ghur, tlic General was obliged to keep with him only 400 
men and to send thc rest back. 
The enterprise for difficulty would seem in prudence to havc demanded 
4,000 men; yet if he had tnkcii s i t h  him only 1,000, hc must have failed 
for want of meter. He supplicdthe want of numbers by couyagc, hardihood, 
and perseverance, trustiiig to the moral effect of these qualities rather than to 
his apparent force. 
It must bc rcmembcred that the British forces in Scinde were a mere 
handful, and could be outnunibered at any point, by ten times the number 
of enemies. In  such a case, dependence on physical force alone, and a 
pedantic adherence to rules and maxims, mould have only becn to  prolong 
the war, thereby eiicoiiraging the Aiiiccrs by an nppcaraiicc of timidity, and 
probably calling to tlrcir aid tlic wild inountaiii tribes d ~ o  were only naiting, 
to iisc a lioniely but expressive phrase, to see which way tho eat jumped. 
Both as rcgardcd the prestige of the Uritish name, ond the character of 
his oppoficnts, the moral was more to be eonsidcred tlian the physical effect. 
It is one of Napoleon’s sayings, that moral force in war is to physical 
force as four to one. If this bc true in European warfarc, wlierc the 
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col,l~~o~itioll courage of opposing armies is nearly equal, we must 
tiecidc that in the case under consideration moral forcc was alniost 
cycrything. 
elthough therefore Sir c. Napicr Occasiodly disregarded mere technical 
and placed himself in situations which to  men of less transcendent 
ability would have been ruin, he did SO because he measured correctly the 
capacity of his adversaries and his own ; and that which in another might 
lIaYe been the extremc of rashncss, was in him only the fruit of the most 
deliberafe and just cakuhtion. 
The sun-stroke and the extreme labour he had endured so seriously 
hie health a t  this time, that the m e d i d  men told him he must go 
to Kurracllee and quit work, or else he must prepare to give up life and 
work together. He went to Kurrachce ; but would by no means consent to 
$ire 
work. 6‘ I f  I take rest one day,” he said, “the work doubles the next.” 
In October, before he had got over the effect of the sun-stroke, he was 
by a terrible fever, which s m p t  over the land, and carried off 
multitudes dike of natives and Europeans. Although tlic lckness mas of 
very depressing nature, the clearness of his mind newr failed, and he was 
still emphatically the Governor of Scinde; and when his friends, who thought 
he was killing himsdf, urged him to resign and go to  England, he answered, 
t i  KO, not to save a thousand lives. The  horses here arc wild; but they 
knolv my liand; with another, they noald start off as he was gathering up 
the reins.” 
. For some months to  come Sir C. Napicr’s labours were devoted to peace- 
ful objects, to the improvernent of the condition of the cultivator by alter- 
ing the tenure of land, by abolishing slavery, promoting irrigation, ft-c.; and 
his memoirs on these and other great administrative reforms, drew from Sir 
Robert Peel the following remark: ‘6 No one,” he said, r‘ ever doubted Sir 
c. Napicr’s military powers; but in his other character he does surprise me. 
He is posscsscd of extraordinary talent for civil administration.” 
IJis efforts were howcver much interfered t~i t l i  a t  this time by descents 
inade on the north-wcst frontier of Scinde by bands of desperate robbcrs, 
who from their numbers formed a small*army. A wide desert interposed 
htneen their mountain strongholds and the frontiers of Scinde. But in the 
summer of 1844, having committcd in some of their incursions acts of great 
atrocity, Sir C. Nnpier resolved to undertake their reduction. For this 
purpose howcver it was necessary to cross the desert, to track them to their 
strongholds, to hem them up in a corner where there should be no escape, 
and aftcrivards to transport them bodily to the plains, and compel them to 
labour instead of robbing for their bread. 
At some future time, perhaps, it may be my privilege to describe in this 
theatre, clearly and in detail, this hill campaign, which was, in my belief, as 
remarkable and as difficult an opcration as mas ever undertaken by a military 
commander. I must now content iripself nitli saying, that after a canrpaigfi 
of fifty-four days, commenced on the 16th January, 1845, he returned, after 
having completely succeeded in all his objects. 
He had crossed the desert, tracked the freebooters, 16,000 men, under 
their chief Beja Khan, a man of Herculean strength and courage, through 
lnountains wliicli for defiles and hidden caves were like a rabbit warren, and 
shut them up finally in thcir famous stronghold of Trukkcc with their dves  
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and families, where lie induced them to surrendrr with the loss of only a few 
livcs. Thenceforth such was the terror of his name that sd long as Sir c. 
Napier remained Governor of Scindc, life and property were almost as secure 
as in England. 
During this campaign he had to bear Iritli the despondency of his own 
officers, lie alone perhaps among thc officers (for tho men having lesshorn- 
ledge had more faith) feeling any confidence in the S I I C C ~ S S  of an enterprize 
Ivhicli to ot1:ers appeared hopeless. 
H e  had to overcome the euormous difficulties of feeding his force, by 
organizing supplies from thc rear; to circumvent the proverbial hill craft of 
his mountaineer enemies, tho duplicity of his guides, and the uncertain 
fidelity of his allies. \\‘it11 a master hand, and a master spirit, he convertd 
all these disadvantages to his oxvn favonr, thus illustrating a passage in 
Plutarch’s Life of Philopccmen, where he says that great man, “adopting the 
Cretan customs, and using their artificcs and sleights, their stratagems and 
ambushes against themselves, soon shewed that their dcviccs were like the 
short-sighted schemes of cliildrcn whcn compared with tlie long reach of an 
experienced general.” 
The robber tribes captured were removed to the plains on the frontier, 
where they became cultivators of the soil, and received land from the govern- 
ment on the tenure of military service against tlie incursions of their kindred 
robbers ; and tlie measure has proved in fact to be completely successful. 
Sir C. Napier now returned to his works of peace, but they ivcrc not long 
destined to he undisturbed. So early as February 1844 he had predict,e$ 
that a mar with thc Sikhs was inevitablc. H e  now, with his remarkable fore- 
cast of mind, matured the plans which he foresaw he mould be called upon 
to execute with the army of Scinde as an auxiliary to the principal British 
force on the Sutlege ; and it was during this intcrval, and in preparation 
for that contingency, that he organized his famous camel baggage corps. 
In  June 1845, perceiving that the storm w s  about to burst, he wrote to 
the Governor-General begging to be allo\wd to organize an auxiliary force. 
But Sir H. Hardingc, mho still thought a t  that time the war might be 
averted, wonld not, allow of any preparation being made, for fear of alarming 
the jealousy of the Sikhs, promising hov;evcr that Sir C. Napier should 
have six i\ceks’ notice for the organization of his field force before the com- 
mencement of hostilities. 
The  Sikhs 1iov;ever gave no noticc, and the news of the battle of 3Iood- 
kee, fought on the 18th December, was the first intimation he received. 
Then indeed he nas ordered to assemble a t  Itoree with all possible speed 
;t field force of 15,000 nicn, 10,000 of whom must come from Hombay, as the 
resources of Scinde were unequal to this demand. 
Sir C. Napier had been forbidden to purchase even ;t camel in anticipa- 
tion. Thus, when the sudden order arrived, he had carriage for only 3,000 
persons, whcn carriage for nearly 50,000 mas required, that being the gross 
total represented Iiy an Indian army of 15,000 fighting men ; and though 
the Bombay complement of this force numbcrcd 30,000 $ad had to be 
marched, after landing a t  Riirrachee, nearly 400 mi!es, yet on the forty- 
second day after the receipt of  the order, the whole force required was con- 
centrated a t  Roree in a perfect state of equipment and discipline ; provided 
with a siege train of thirty-two pieces with 1,000 rounds a gun ; eight field 
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btteries; engineer park and provisions for three months ; as well as a pon- 
toon train bearing 300 yards of bridge. 
only officers who have been called on to organise a force hastily under 
circumstances of similar difficulty can at a11 appreciate sucll a result. 
Sir C. Napier’s general plan was to create a diversion by marching on 
The details were :- 
T~ form his principal magazines at Ooch, situated at the confluence of 
the Chenaub with the Sutlege. 
TO divide his force between 0 0 c h  and Uhawulpore; to bridge tlle river 
at those places, and to make a concentric movement with those tmo columns 
on Shoojuabnd, mhich place must be taken. The siege train to ascend the 
CIlenaub in steamers, protected by the Ooch column, which would move along 
the left bank of that river. 
TO provide for retreat in case of necessity, a double bridge head wak to 
bc constructetl at Ooch, and armed with the steamer guns. The defence of 
this fete rle pon t  to be entrusted to the Uhairulpore levies, on which he  could 
R1y, SO that lie should be free to march on Shoojcabad with his whole force. 
Shoojuabad being taken, to form an expense magazine a t  that place, 
ahicli would then become his base of suppl, for the siege of Mooltan. 
If he succeeded in taking Mooltan, of wliicli he felt little doubt, as he was 
correspoi~dcnce with parties within the walls, that town would be his 
pij-ot for further operations. A powerful diversion would already be 
effected, which would Ire certain to  relieve the Uritish army on the Sutlege 
& a  grcat deal of pressure ; and the advance which Sir C. Napier then con- 
templated on Lahore, \vould draw off the Siklis alfogetlier from the Sutlege 
to  protect their capital. 
The General’s plan was to move up the Indus from Korcc in two co- 
lumns, one on each h n k ,  with the steam flotilla between thein ; to pass his 
whole force to tlie right bank at blittcnkoke, where he first expected to meet 
with resistance, and to crush -that town under the concentrated fire of his 
eighty guns. This, he observed, was rather like “killing a gnat with a 
sledge-hammer ;” but, besides the value of time, he knew what dangerous op- 
ponents the Siklis would be behind stone walls, and his object was to terrify 
Shoojuabad and RIooltan by the example of the sudden destruction of 
Mittenkoke. 
He had laid his plans for raising the population, which mas unfriendly to 
the Sikhs, as far as Deyrah Game i and if he had been permitted to assem- 
ble his army as early as he had desired, he would, in all probability, judg- 
ing from his past successes, have burst on Lahore with 25,000 fightingmen 
long before the battle of Sobraon. 
But it was otherwise ordained ; for the battle of Fcrozeshah had been 
fought, and the Governor-General suddenly ordered Sir C. Napier to  quit 
his army, and come in person to tlie head-quarter camp on the Sutlege. 
Arrived a t  the Governor-General’s camp on tliu 3rd RIarch, he found 
tl!C victory of Sobraon had been won, that a treaty was in progress, and that 
111s projected campaign must remain only a project for ever. 
Of the treaty then concluded he altogether disapproved, believing that the 
Ollly way to avert a second struggle was to annex the Punjaub a t  once; 
whereas, he said, if a puppet. king like Duleep Singh was established, the 
VOT,. IT, L 
~rooi tm.  
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battle would lime to be fought again, rivers of blood would flow, and the w. 
sult might be doubtful.” 
I n  two years from that time, Blooltan, Ramnugghr, Chillianwdlah, and 
Goojerat, bore testimony to the truth of the prediction. 
Sir C. Napier quitted Scinde in January 1848. When ho first set foot 
in  that country he found society without the protection of law ; slavery was 
widely spread; murder, especially of women, of almost daily occurrence ; 
robbery univeral; the only law a a s  that of the strongeat. 
When he quitted Scinde he left. it without 3 slsve. T h e  turbulent 
Beloochees whom he had found with sword and matchlock, tlie licensed 
robbers and oppressors of the poor, had becn compelled by him to shoulder 
the spade and mattock, and were submissive to  a constable’s staff. 
He had in short found ;I divided population ; misery and servitude on the 
one hand-on the other, a barbarous tyranny. He left an united regene- 
rated people, rejoicing in a rising civilization, the work of his beneficent 
genius. 
The  second Sikh war broke out, and in Morcli 1849,just a year after hi8 
return, Sir C. Napier again quitted England for India ; his appointment to 
the supreme military command in that country having been most unwilI- 
ingly forced on the East India Company, by an unanimity of plhlic fceling 
rarely witnessed, 
And so, at the age of sixty-sevcn, suffering niost painfully from old 
wounds and labouring under a mortal internal diseaee, he gave up the ho- 
nourable and honoured repose lie had so hardly earned, quitted his wife 
and children, and, in the words of the facetious philosopher Punch, ‘1 he took 
his two towels and his piece of sonp, and his scimitar, and he went away to 
the ship which was to carry him to tho iea.” 
Arrived in India, ho found that Lord Gough liad in the interval com- 
pletely broken the power of the Sikhs, and the war was at an end. 
Henceforward he had to  perform the ordinary duties of Commander-in- 
Chief. At  the end of a year of hard labour, his public career wa0 suddenly 
brought to a close by ;I circumstanec which is of sufficient importatice to be 
detailed, since it has been misrepresented to Sir C. Napier’s disadvantage. 
By a regulation of the Indian Government, Sepoy as well as European 
. regiments were entitled to increased pay when serving beyond the frontier 
of the British dominions. Under this regulation the troops stationed in the 
Punjaub received that increased pay up to the period when the Punjaub was 
annexed. When that country was declared an integral part of the British 
Eastern Empire, the extra pay was siiddenly stopped. 
And how was it stopped? 
No account was taken of the feelings of human nature i n  general, which 
are accustomed to view with decided disrelish any diminution of creature- 
comforts once enjoyed. 
No account was taken of the susceptibilities of the Sepoy soldier in par- 
ticular, which had alrcady on more than one occasion, within $r C. Napier’s 
own experience, manifested themselves in open mutiny on this very question 
of reduction of pay. 
The extra pay was simply stopped by a dry odcial order, without expla- 
nation, without reflecting on thc danger of tampering with the pay of mer- 
cenaries, who, while they were bound by no tic of fidelity h t  their pay, had 
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u,fly grounds of cstraiigemeiit in differing religion, colour, and race; mer- 
Although Sir c. Napier disapproved, as any man of common senee must 
do, ofthis (‘ mo&is operad’,’,” he set himself to enforce the order and to 
t e ~ ~  the mischief he feared ~ ~ o u l d  result from it. The discontent, as he 
TWO regimcnts in the Punjaub refused to receive the reduced pay, and 
sctivo correspondence was did wovered to exist between them and other 
@rp?, sonic of them nlready in the l’unjaub, others under orders to proceed 
thither. 
The 4 l s t  Native Infantry a t  Delhi, 400 miles from the other malcontents, 
ds& to enter the Punjaub withoht the highel. pay; and i t  was well known 
that m:my other regiments were prepared to follow their example. Sir C. 
Hapier by desterous managemcnt checked the disaffection in the 41st, and 
tj,, regiment marched. 
But another regiment, the GGth, just arrived from Lucknow, broke out 
into open mutiny, and actually attempted to seize Govhd-Ghur, one of the 
fortresses of the Punjaub, which was in the midst of the most disaf- 
fected portion of the Sikh population. 
The danger was very menacing, yet by tact and firmness i t  was averted. 
The sererest punishment which the Government could inflict on a whole 
Fegiment ~ W J  to  disband it ; but the disaffected felt sum this measure would 
llot be resorted to, as the discharged soldiers must be replaced, according 
to immemorial usage, by men of the same race and religion, their brothers 
and cousins. Indecd the Brahmins openly boasted that the Government 
could get no soldiers if they chose to stop recruiting. 
Sir C; Napier hoxever ’broke through the trammels of Indian routine, 
&standed the GGth, and garo its colours R‘nd number to  a Ghoorkah batta- 
lion, which henceforth became the G6th Native Infantry. 
By this move he clieck-mated the mutineers. To have disbanded the 
regiment as a solitary measure would only hsve teen productive of mischief; 
the Sepoys felt sure the Government could not go on playing that game; 
they could not disband a wvhole army ; but vhen they found Government 
WEE preparcd to replace them by men of a different race, they trembled to 
iociir the same penalty as tlic GGth had suffered, and murmuring was a t  
an end. I should liere niention that the Ghoorkahs make far better and 
braver soldiers than the Bcngal Sepoys generally. 
The Governor-General approved of Sir C. Napier’s action of disbanding 
the 66th, but dieapproved of his adoption of the Ghoorkas in their place, 
the only thing that could give point or cfficacy to the measurc. 
ROT comes the point to  which I desire particularly to direct attention : 
Twelve days before the mutiny of tho GGth at Govind-Ghur, a new corn- 
misaariat regulation of the supreme Government, unimportant in itself, came 
into operation. This regulation caused the‘ usual allowance made to the 
@XJYS for purchasing their food to vary with the market prices of the 
places where they were stationed. It happened that its operation in the 
Pilnjnul, itself would be to diminish-to n very trifling extent indeed-but 
still to diminish, the pay of the Sepoy in  that province. Sir 0. Napier 
judged that to proniulgatc and cnforcc this ordinance, at a time when, ns 
W a s  proved twelve days later by the Govind-Ghur mutiny, very serious dis 
L 2  
of such power* that once aroused nothing could control them. 
-q spread widely. 
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afection existed 011 account of the reduction of pay already e n f o r c e d 4  say 
thc General judgcd that to enforce this new ordinance, further reducing pay, 
would make the smouldering embers of sedition blaze forth, and would be in 
fact an act of judicial madness. 
I t  was not the amount, for that was trifling; i t  was the fact that it 
was aficrthar reduction, iu tlie state in which the Sepoys’ minds viere at 
the time, that constituted the danger. Sir C. Napier took it on himself 
--in entire accordance with the opinions of Sir Patrick Grant, Sir Walter 
Gilbert, and General Hearsay, officers of great Indian cxperience-to 
suspend-not to annul, but to suspend-the operation of this as yet un- 
knomn measure, until its impolicy could be represented to  the supreme GO- 
yernment. The  whole sum thus withheld from Government only amounted 
to a few pounds, although that does not of course affect the principle. 
For thus overstepping his legal powcrs Sir C. Napier was, by the 
Governor in Council, publicly and offensively reprimanded, the general 
order coureying the reprimand being signed by a major in the Indian 
army under Iris command. Nc was forbidden ever to exercise his dis- 
cretion in such mattcrs, or under any circumstanccs, again ; and the Com- 
mander-in-Chief immediately tendcred his rcsignation of a post which he 
could no longer occupy with advantage to the public, or with honour to 
himself. 
Any one who will take the troublc to go into tliis matter will find 
that I have simply staled facts, and no ingenuity can pervert them. 
I d l  not trust myself to remark 011 this treatment-a treatment 
which Sir C. Napier’s position, age, and great services ought to have 
rendered impossible. i will only say that I cannot conceive the possi- 
bility of any impartial mind, endowcd with tho commonest powers of rea- 
soning, which should investigatrtd all the Circumstances connected with 
this suspcnsion by tlie General of tho rcgulation referred to, without 
arriving at the conviction that Sir C. Napicr was wholly and absolutely 
in the right ; and I will say further, that an officer in  his situation would be 
unworthy to be trusted with any command who would not act in the 
same manner in Eke circumstances.. 
Sir (3. Napier landed in England in March, 1851. I n  August, 1853, 
he died, aftcr the most qcute sufferings, borne with the utmost fortitude 
and eren cheerfulness. 
The following quotation from a memoir drawn up by Colonel Rath- 
borne, an able and expcrienced Indian officer who had served under Sir 
C. Napier in the field as well as in the posts of magistrate and collector of 
Scinde, shews how that great man was considered by his subordinates :- 
(6 It is not merely because I hare  eaten his salt that I am faithful to  Sir 
Charles Napier’s memory and to Sir Charles Napier’s cause-I am faithful 
to  it from the knodedge tliat lie was really and truly one of the noblest 
and most admirable of England’s sons, and would, Iiad he livcd and had he 
possessed the power, liave bcen the regenerator of England, and the saviour 
of our empire in the East. II? mould havc fixed the foundations of that 
empire on the surcst basis, justicc to the pcoplc, sccuring the people’s love. 
Hc ~sould havc made India a country to be a help to England in its neces- 
sities, instrad of ;L sink to absorb alike its treasures and its men. He 
would have cosercd its surface with roads and canals, instead of devoting its 
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resources to the maintenance in luxury of the drones who noK orer- 
qread it.” 
posterity will not fail to note that the warrior, who, when feasting and 
r2joicing w m  the order of the day, was laid aside and forgotten like a 
rusted tool, was called from his retirement by the unanimous cry of n 
nation, as the only man who could save the Indian Empire lvhen sup- 
p e d  to be in utmost p e d .  It will note aell,-that this man who \yas 
forgottenbat the feast, was the first to be remembered in the fray. 
TO the judameat of that posterity we may safely leave the heroic 
and great actions of Charles James &pier, on the one hand: 
and on the other, the conduct of the ministers of the day, who failed to 
do honour to themselves by honouring him. 
His &eds have been imperishably recordcd by the great writer, whose 
in this theme was animated and warmed by the most devoted 
brotherly affection. 
He also has passed away from among us, the last of that noble band 
of soldier brothers, whose brarery, whose wounds, and romantic mutual 
affection, were as household words in the camp of the great Peninsular army. 
Few episodes in history are so elevating, and at  the same time so 
touching, as the record of the early military life of Charles, George, 
and William Napier. 
I again quote from the speech of Sir Robert Peel, made on the oc- 
asion already referred to. Speaking of the critical state of affairs when 
Sir C. Napier took the command in Scinde, he says :- 
6‘ It was most fortunate that at such a crisis, aiid under such circum- 
stances, the command of the British army was upon those days com- 
mitted to one of three brothers, who, engrafted upou mi ancient stem, 
graced the brigade to which they belonged, by that perfect nobility which 
derived its brightest lustre from an unblcmishcd prirate character, and the 
highest sense of the purest honour, and whose fame, won by repeated proofs 
of d o u r  in tho field of battle,had made their name conspicuous in the annals 
of history. They had learned-each of the brothers had learned-the ar t  of 
war under an illustrious (ommander. During the whole of his military cam- 
paigns-of which one of/ them was the faithful, the impartial, and the 
eloquent historian ; duritg the whole of thoso campaigns the exploits of 
these thrce brothers were such as  to entitle them to the gratitude of their 
country. In almost every action in the Peninsula they had given proof 
of their military skill and valour; but in the actions of Corunna, of 
Busaco, and Ciudad Rodrigo, and during the operations of the Pyrenees, 
nclne of the gallant British officers or men mere more prodigal of their 
blood in the cause of their country, than each of the officers to whom 
he alluded,” 
England, whose vines bear such clusters, whose mothers bring forth 
such sons, will never call in vain for men worthy to uphold her honour 
abroad or to defend her sacred soil; and, though their iiaincs are as 
yet conccalcd behind the veil of the future, lct us hope a i d  confidently 
believe, that, when the emergency shall arise, the mantle bornc by those 
noble soldiers, transmitted to thcm, his most illustrious pupils, by their 
great master, will be found to h a w  dcvolved on shoulders worthy t o  
bear it. 
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There was a r&markablc similarity in thc characters and dispositionJ uf 
Charles and William &pier. To say that thcy had faults is only to adM 
that they were human. But their most ardent opponents, enemies noa 
no longer, could never accusc them of anything mean or  little. Their 
faults wcre thosc of noble and gcncrous natures. 
They seem to havc adopted from their childhood as thcir rule of action, 
the motto “pavce)*e subjectis et clebellnm siipei*bos,” nnd llonc ever acfed 
up to  it more consistcntly. T h o  readiness with which any story of opp- 
sion or wrong was rcceived-sometimes perhaps on insufhient grounds, 
and the ficrccness with which it was denounecd ; nll rcsulted from a ten. 
derness of nature, which, towards the weak and the helpless, and remark. 
abl towards women, children, and aiiimals, was absolutely womanly. 
J v e r  sincc his return from active service under Wellington, Sir  William 
&pier’s was a life of almost constant euffcring, caused principally by a 
bullet which, having lodged near the backbone, could never be rcmoved. 
During the last two years his sufferings were unremitting and into. 
lerable, and I shall ever remember, as one of the most impressive lessons 
of my life, that I was permitted to  witness the fortitude, patience, cheer- 
fulness, and consideration for those about him, with which thosc sufferings 
were borne. 
None who read thc clcar and vigorous letters whicli froin time to time, 
up to a few weeks of his end, appeared in the newspapers, could a t  all 
guess the stato of torture in which the writer lay;  or could appreciate 
the sublime victory obtained by tho indomitablo soul over tho weak and 
suffering bod . 
To him t l e British ormy owcs more thaii to any man who has ever 
lived-for has hc not iinmorbnlized its achicvenients ? 
1’0 his lieu tho great Duke himself’ is more indebted for the complctc- 
ness and pcrmancncc of his famc, than he is to his own great deeds. 
To him finally-auci this would have becn his proudest boast-the pri- 
vate soldier owes mom than to any othcr man, for liis was the first voice 
to advocate the right of thc privatc Eoldier to sliarc individually in the 
honour, as ho has always donc in tlic dangers, of the battle-field ; aud it is 
rernarkablc that this right was first practically admittedand stamped as ina- 
lienable by his brother in tho despatch of his first victory of Meanee. 
To the last Sir William Napicr delighted in the society of young men, 
particularly officers. He was always pleased to impart information and to 
discuss with them the subjects of the day ; and the patience, cveu deference, 
with which lic listened to their opinions in return, shcwed x humbleness of 
mind, which those perhaps who did not know him infimately would have 
been slow to attribute to him. 
T h e  love and the reverence with which he inspired those who thus came 
. in contact with him, partook of the feelings with which a clansman regarded 
his chief. For  the numerous officers who used to repair to his bedside 
to  hear words of wisdom, clothed, as they involuntarily were, with marvel- 
lous force and eloquence, his removal hes created a gap that can never bc 
filled. But his words and his memory will live in their hearts, and his 
name will never be forgotten so long as and wherever tho English language 
shall be read. 
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